

MCGARVEY BOOK:

CIA. The Myth and the Madness

The statements in the McGarvey book which would appear to be of special interest to the Congress seem to coalesce into five somewhat overlapping categories:

- (a) The Director's central responsibility;
- (b) Compendium of authoritative criticism;
- (c) Chronic issues;
- (d) New issues;
- (e) Congressional sensitivity.

Statements in the book falling under the above headings are identified or summarized in the attached.

The personal experiences of the author and "his sources" as related in the book, together with selected quotations from unbiased authoritative sources, gives the book a ring of truth and credibility. It would not be surprising if similar outpourings are precipitated by the publicity which inevitably will ensue by the publication of the book.

The Director's Central Responsibility

(Note: The central theme in the book is the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community. Case examples which are used to demonstrate lack of responsiveness, lack of centralized control, inefficient collection, outmoded activities, and lack of timeliness, quality and scope of intelligence information, would be a useful partial data base for a congressional committee investigation of the track record since 5 November 1971, since what are viewed as problems in the book are objectives for improvement in the President's 5 November 1971 "Reorganization of the Intelligence Community,")

Pg. 6--150,000 persons employed in intelligence

Pg. 12--regarding a field program in Vietnam which was not working and not so reported because "It's funded in budget... White House has bought concept, so it has to work."

Pg. 15--post mortems characterized as missing basic problem of lack of central direction and control

Pg. 18--list of failures and problems

Pg. 19--responsible officials know that centralized computer file on potential domestic trouble spots is violation of charter of intelligence community

Pg. 21, 22, 23--reviews Admiral Lowrance, of DIA, run-in with Congressman Whitten "I have heard it goes in excess of 517 linear feet of unprocessed data."

Pg. 23--Laird's 1970 defense budget--intelligence as major management problem--5 point solution

The-Director's Central Responsibility

- Pg. 25--House Armed Service Committee report regarding Pueblo/EC-121 questions capability to cope with emergency situations
- Pg. 25--"Since the Director is responsible for ensuring the efficient use of intelligence..."
- Pg. 26, 27--with clandestine political action you at least have individual men assuming responsibility, but the operation of technical collection is left to committees with no single entity accountable for an entire program--collect more regardless of worth and no program to assess
- Pg. 30, 31, 32--illustration of Executive disaffection or lack of faith in intelligence
- Pg. 33--if our intelligence is the best, our policymakers should be the best informed
- Pg. 61--lingering anachronism of military attaches
- Pg. 66--difficulty of establishing adequate control once collection program started because of complex bureaucracy
- Pg. 74--spawning of PI shops because no one will rely on judgment of other units
- Pg. 74--100 tons of paper a day (translation time)
- Pg. 88--Joint Intelligence Estimates for Planning (permit weapons procurement without objective appraisal of DIA's work)
- Pg. 90--1947 compromise lead to loose confederation around political vested interests--DIA paper broker for service programs--CIA's technical competence questioned
- Pg. 91--no central management of men or material in computer field
- Pg. 92--all seems to be functioning well as long as each lives within budget restriction
- Pg. 93--unquenchable thirst for collection--new gadgets must be used
- Pg. 94--HASC not convinced magnitude of intelligence activity completely justified and resources properly used

- Pg. 97--White House misinformed about presence of Pueblo in territorial waters
- Pg. 98--Pueblo-1 Comint station in Korea and 2 in Japan already covering target and USAF flying 60 Elint missions against same area
- Pg. 103-108--Pueblo case used to demonstrate inadequate control over monthly recon --excessive risks and costs in ops against marginal targets of only local or parochial interests, duplication & overkill
- Pg. 109 -- insatiable appetite for information exceeds competence to assess-- questions need for continuous coverage of important targets since there is no such thing as sudden appearance in new technological developments
- Pg. 111--computer ingestion capability puts off final day of reckoning-- Paris Peace Talks as example the higher ranking JCS dominates inter-agency committees
- Pg. 132--using Paris Peace Talks as example the higher ranking JCS dominates interagency committees
- Pg. 133--glaring differences within community on estimate of enemy strength led to loss of 20,000 U. S. lives in Vietnam--responsibility transferred from DIA to field
- Pg. 138--division of labor not working--each has portion of each slice resulting in duplication contrary to NSC directives, i. e., OSR exactly same as DIA, NSA by charter not to issue final intelligence, but does (Pg. 140)
- Pg. 142--as ~~Blue Ribbon Panel~~ noted, service intell agencies which DIA was to supplant are now larger than ever
- Pg. 143--in 1968, House committee declared need to reorganize in DOD, 1969, *ibid.* 1970, Blue Ribbon Panel *ibid*
- Pg. 144--DIA suppose to approve budget of services but didn't know what was going on
- Pg. 147--it will take a reorganization by the President to break down departmental lines and bias

- have
- Pg. 203-- Helms does not/clout over other agencies--he does not have any interest in administering community--85 percent of \$5 billion spent by DOD
- Pg. 228--characterizes 5 Nov. 1971 Reorganization as minor shuffling at top and more committees to serve superstructure
- Pg. 229--references Presidential "Decision Memo" which spells out dissatisfaction and desires in detail (faulty intelligence, run-away budget, glut of facts and poverty of analysis)--cites Kraft column "one more device for destroying independent centers of analysis and information inside government. "
- Pg. 232--airs Symington charge that intelligence being taken out of hands of career professionals and given to military and White House--Fulbright analysis of further erosion of congressional control over intell community
- Pg. 235--downgrades PFIAB effectiveness and laments lack of continuous responsibility for imposing public accountability

Compendium of Authoritative Criticism

(Note: The substance of the material covered under this heading is treated under other headings as appropriate. Separate treatment is important because the statements tend to corroborate the author's arguments, adding credibility. The mere fact that the author is a former employee, that his book serves as a vehicle for unidentified employees to express their opinions and recount their personal experiences, and that there is a mysterious unidentified Congressman who arranged covert meetings to discuss these matters, adds a certain degree of credibility also.)

Pg. 21--Congressman Jamie Whitten

Pg. 23--Secretary Laird

Pg. 25--HASC

Pg. 30, 31, 32--Kissinger, "piece of crap" concerning Britain and EC,
Kissinger, JFK, LBJ, Roger Hilsman

Pg. 35--Senator Ervin--disclosing Army spying on public

Pg. 36--CIA brochure regarding Director's responsibility for intelligence activities

Pg. 93--HASC regarding excessive collection

Pg. 142--Blue Ribbon Panel regarding DIA

Pg. 143--House committee need for reorganization in DOD as a whole

Pg. 147--Congressman Jamie Whitten duplication AF/DIA contracts

Pg. 161--author's statement about poly questions on sex life

Pg. 197--secretive meeting former employees/ New York state congressman
fearing open meetings

- Pg. 197--reporter on Los Angeles Times getting material on Son Tay believing CIA has big brother role
- Pg. 209--Hoover Commission 1955 recommends Joint Committee
- Pg. 213-- "Hamilton" report 1967, excessive collection
- Pg. 217--Since 1947 over 200 resolutions for more systematic oversight of intelligence
- Pg. 218--Mansfield's 1956 effort and Fulbright/McCarthy 1966 effort for Joint Committee
- Pg. 219--Fulbright's characterization ~~of the~~ from Armed Services sessions he ~~was~~ sat in on as accomplishing little, no minutes, ten-minute rule in effect, Director preempts time on Soviet missiles, and tells them only what he wants them to know-- Men on committee interested in shielding CIA
- Pg. 229--President's decision memo on what's wrong with community -- Kraft column that independence being destroyed--echoed by Symington, pg. 232 and Fulbright regarding erosion of congressional control

Chronic Issues

(Note: The material covered under this heading deals with allegations or issues from the book and which previously have been the subject of specific or general inquiry or interest in the Congress.)

- Pg. 11, 12--CIA "counter-terror program"
- Pg. 65--horror story regarding Saigon defector center --"shrink" experimenting with lights, heat, cold
- Pg. 18--"CIA's involvement with Green Berets in political assassination" and involvement of intelligence (Army) in internal security for which "the Director has responsibility"
- Pg. 35--Helms' head should roll for Army spying--charter responsibility for all U. S. intelligence activities
- Pg. 58--silver iodide clouds to break up Vietnamese demonstrations
- Pg. 78--regarding 1964 Gulf of Tonkin, raw unprocessed intelligence was served as finished reporting to policymakers
- Pg. 95--characterizing ultimate irony of intelligence--international incidents result from collection program designed to provide information to allow U. S. to avoid such incidents
- Pg. 97--White House misinformed about presence of Pueblo in territorial waters
- Pg. 104--CIA agreed with judgment that Pueblo sailed in international waters and involved minimal risks
- Pg. 107--one and a half hours to review thick monthly recon schedule
- Pg. 129--CIA left Pentagon in dark about maritime operations versus North Vietnam (Pueblo)

Pg. 225--Lack of public confidence in intelligence--turned inward on citizens--mounting intelligence operations against citizens, groups assemblies

Pg. 237--Government Operations Committee has a broader perspective than Armed Services Committee and shares oversight responsibility

New Issues

(Note: the book presents a number of issues which have not resulted in strong congressional interest or action so far and which may suggest areas for inquiry.)

- Pg. 12--"It's funded in the budget so it has to work"
- Pg. 14--inadequate estimate internal situation in Cambodia because President serious about the venture and nobody wanted to make waves
- Pg. 19, 20--long hours of idleness--men in scientific shop program computers and replay Redskins game each Monday
- Pg. 29--penetration of Chinese border by U.S. aircraft--findings compromised in committee--CIA sold out on its only commodity of "consistent credibility", failing to recall swiftness of some LBJ decisions
- Pg. 30--~~internal CIA dissatisfaction with Helms--Ray Cline--Admiral Taylor resign in disgust--Rayborn jokingly fearing assassination by an deputy~~ internal CIA dissatisfaction with Helms--Ray Cline--Admiral Taylor resign in disgust--Rayborn jokingly fearing assassination by an deputy
- Pg. 60--promotions judged by number of cables sent to DC (quantity, not quality rules supreme despite all efforts to change system)--typical case officer doesn't recruit new agent but uses old--Pg. 61-- lack of responsibility commensurate with age and experience
- Pg. 65--35 DCS field offices, Pg. 66--recruit many of the students who are nabbed by Soviets while trying to collect tidbits
- Pg. 66--lack of adequate control over collection program after it is initiated
- Pg. 73--agri culture specialist followed Soviet wheat crop (NPIC) (shortfall should have been reported -- if not, intelligence failure)
- Pg. 74--spawning of PI shops because no one will rely on judgment of other units--100 tons of paper a day (translation time)
- Pg. 80--comparison DIA and CIA bulletin
- Pg. 89--failure of collection guidance shops to control, manage and monitor collection

- Pg. 90--questions CIA's competence on certain technical committees
- Pg. 95--technical collection is the fair-haired program and garners bulk of promotions -- analysts who make sense out of what is collected shunted aside
- Pg. 95--international incidents result from collection program designed to provide information to avoid such incidents
- Pg. 109--there is no such thing as a sudden appearance of new strategic weapons systems, yet collectors insist on continuous coverage
- Pg. 110--no one outside intelligence community balances the need to collect versus the possibility of adding to international tension
- Pg. 111--computer capacity puts off final day of reckoning on excessive collection
- Pg. 117-- committee approach to intelligence leads to duplication and inept operations --need is, pg. 125, for special effort of thoughtful individual insight and the encouragement of unorthodox views
- Pg. 133--glaring differences within community on estimate of enemy strength led to loss of 20,000 U.S. lives in Vietnam
- Pg. 138--division of labor not working--each has portion of each slice resulting in duplication contrary to NSC directives, i.e., OSR exactly same as DIA, NSA by charter not to issue final intelligence, but does (pg. 140)
- Pg. 129--while CIA ran pacification there was no indication that things were going poorly--this changed after military took over
- Pg. 175--regarding domestic training assignment "still unable to carry our guns"
- Pg. 185--different pay scales in DDP, DDI and S&T
- Pg. 189--solid WASP BASTION
- Pg. 193--CIA management shifted often, resulting in broad administrative skills and inadequate substantive knowledge

Pg. 198--CIA has big brother role and page 199, Helms taps phones of subordinates

Pg. 222--litany of charges--people frustration, technology running riot-confusing welter of committees, child of compromise, personnel inequities, duplication, unnecessary waste, stumble into international incident that could lead to war

Pg. 226--suggestion for reorganization, putting one guy in charge of the major functions which would eliminate duplication, result in large savings in computer programs, --include a net evaluation group

Pg. 234--no need for secrecy in intelligence budget

Pg. 235--there is a need for continued public accountability --call to public to raise level of complaints as was done with the drug issue and the system will be changed

Congressional Sensitivity


(Note: items in this category raise issues in which some degree of congressional sensitivity has already been registered. The member or committees involved are identified.)

- Pg. 7-- excessive drinking (Mahon)
- Pg. 11, 12--counter-terror programs (Tunney and former Senators Morse and Brewster)
- Pg. 18-- "CIA's involvement with Green Berets" (Rodino)
- Pg. 26--Fulbright characterized Senate Armed Services Committee oversight as a lack thereof (Stennis, et al)
- Pg. 30--Kissinger has not asked for NIE on Vietnam (this could be helpful with handling of Fulbright's pending request) and is only interested in facts and assessment of evidence (feeds Symington/Fulbright concern on control moving to White House)
- Pg. 40, 42, 51--appears to be breach of security on resolution, Comint, and Elint (Hebert/Nedzi/Mahon)
- Pg. 54--references to cover as HEW educational specialist, Dept. of Agriculture agronomists (McGovern/Proxmire)
- Pg. 58--rainmaking (Nelson/Proxmire/Fulbright)
- Pg. 82--identification of various community reports, CIA (Braswell/Slatinshek)
- Pg. 83--FBIS trends and world reaction report made available to selected college libraries (all Members) on behalf of their libraries)
- Pg. 109--insatiable appetite for excessive collection--SA-2 range problem involving SA-2 .2 kilometers (Whitten)

- Pg. 117--horrors of committee system (McClellan--recent action in exempting CIA from advisory committee control legislation)
- Pg. 129--in connection with Pueblo, CIA left Pentagon in dark about maritime ops (House Armed Service Committee--Pike)
- Pg. 179, 180--excessive drinking (Mahon)
- Pg. 188-- solid WASP. BASTION (Javits/Dent/ EEOC legislation)
- Pg. 161, 197, 198, ¹⁹⁹199--CIA big brother role against public, congressman, and 161-- employees, reporters (Senator Ervin/Hanley)
- Pg. 215--CIA is not under close congressional scrutiny (committee Chairmen and staff)
- Pg. 214--appears to be breach of ~~security~~ security on Scrambler of NSA (Hebert/Nedzi/Mahon)
- Pg. 216--Director picks members of congressional committee (our Chairmen)
- Pg. 216--intelligence community brief Senate Foreign Relations 8 times 1970 (Stennis)
- Pg. 219--Fulbright's characterization from Armed Services sessions he sat in on as accomplishing little, no minutes, ten-minute rule in effect, Director preempts time on Soviet missiles, and tells them only what he wants them to know--men on committee interested in shielding CIA (Stennis)
- Pg. 233--Senate subcommittee did not meet once in 1971 (Stennis/Braswell)
- Pg. 237--Government Operations Committee has broader perspective than Armed Services Committee and shares oversight responsibility (Stennis/Hebert)

BEST COPY

AVAILABLE



25X1X8

